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ABSTRACT
Nietzshe's philosophical ideas are closely based upon 
his early studies of Greek thought. Unless his philosophy is 
approached from the standpoint of its foundation in the 
ancient Greeks, Heraclitus in particular, then it can be
difficult to gain a coherent picture of Nietzsche's thought.
In Heraclitus he found an affirmation of precisely what 
he loved about the ancient Greek way of life, its most 
fundamental concept: the contest. The Greeks embrace their 
apparently terrible characteristics and control them with a 
rule-governed contest. In the same way Heraclitus's universe 
consists of opposites which strive for dominion, not through
wars of annihilation, but by a rule-ordered contest of
forces. According to Heraclitean strife, the Greek contest, 
and Nietzsche's will to power, a balancing out of opposing 
forces is never achieved, otherwise the struggle which fuels 
existence would die out. The struggle must never be 
extinguished; opposing forces must continue the battle, each 
overcoming the other in turn, for all eternity. This is the 
way in which the eternal recurrence serves as a prescription 
for the overman. The will to power, mankind's unrefined 
animosity and envy, must be acknowledged by the strong
individual and transformed from a nihilistic force into one
of positive ambition and increase. The eternal recurrence is
vi
what the overman strives for within himself; since the rules
of eternal becoming, of the contest, do not apply to humanity 
by nature. Each individual must choose whether to enter into 
the eternal contest or to extinguish the struggle with his 
will to power by denying his passions. The eternal
recurrence and will to power fit together in that it is the 
belief in eternal recurrence which gives great individuals 
the strength to acknowledge the potential of this terrible
drive as a source of elevation and increase.
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CHAPTER ONE
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
It is convenient and sometimes illuminating to divide a
philosopher's works into stages, such as early, middle, and 
late; and while there are many reasons to do so in the case 
of Nietzsche's corpus, such a separation can detract from the 
unity that underlies his various writings. A distinction is 
usually made between Nietzsche's earlier philological 
writings and his later, published works. This division is 
easily justified because the early writings are technically 
philological rather than philosophical; and, since Nietzsche 
did not publish them, the early writings are thought not to 
represent his views as accurately as his published books. It 
is easy to classify Nietzsche's works in this way, but the 
importance of Nietzsche's early philological studies of the 
Greeks, and of other early unpublished essays, should not be 
overlooked. Rather than assuming that the authentic 
Nietzsche only showed himself in his published works, one 
should treat his unpublished essays as valuable companions to 
his books. When Nietzsche is approached in this way, one can 
see the continuity in his thought, and the common source 
which sustains his later philosophical ideas.
1
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The influence or inspiration of the ancient Greeks can
be found at the source of Nietzsche's earliest work as well
as at the heart of his later philosophy. His central
interest, the concern for modern culture, arose out of his
philological studies. By tracing the Heraclitean element in
Nietzsche's thought, the unity among his early and late 
writings and the connection between his philosophical ideas 
is highlighted; for the main elements of his views on 
culture—the will to power, eternal recurrence and the
overman—are all grounded in a distinctively Heraclitean
world-view.
Though the present fragmentary condition of 
Heraclitus's works may make it difficult to understand the
subtleties of his thought, this should not hinder a study of 
Nietzsche's understanding and use of Heraclitus. As Sarah 
Kofman points out, Heraclitus was obscure even to his 
contemporaries who had access to all of his texts (1987, 39).
Moreover, one must remember that Nietzsche also had only
fragmentary material to work with. His edition of the 
fragments was somewhat different from what we have today; he
did not have access to H. Diels's Die Fraqmente der
Vorsokratiker, which eliminates some fragments previously
attributed to Heraclitus.
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In chapter one I discuss the current literature dealing 
with the significance of Nietzsche's philological works and
concerning his relationship to Heraclitus. In chapter two I
examine the influence of the Greeks, particularly Heraclitus, 
on Nietzsche's early thought, and the continued presence of
Heraclitus's influence on Nietzsche's ideas of the will to
power, eternal recurrence and the overman. In chapter three
I discuss criticisms of Nietzsche's interpretation of
Heraclitus, including Heidegger's criticism that Nietzsche's 
interpretation gives little attention to the logos and places 
too much importance on change. When Nietzsche's
interpretation of Heraclitus is understood in light of his 
relation to the ancient Greeks in general, it can illuminate 
aspects of his philosophic thought that are easily
misunderstood. In chapter four, the ideas of eternal
recurrence, will to power, and overman are shown to fit 
together according to their common ground in the Heraclitean
cosmos and the Greek contest.
Though prominent scholars such as R. J. Hollingdale 
believe that little can be gained from the study of 
Nietzsche's early unpublished works, others have emphasized 
the importance of these writings, such as Daniel Breazeale
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and Karl Schlechta. Hollingdale advises against focusing 
one's interpretation of Nietzsche on the unpublished works.
If one were to rely on them, says Hollingdale, then one, "has
to assume that since he published what he should have 
rejected and rejected what he should have published,
Nietzsche was unaware of what his opinions really were or 
deliberately sought to conceal them, and there is no evidence 
for either contention" (1965, xii). Hollingdale is not 
referring to the notes of the 1880's collected as The Will to
Power, which no "serious scholar" would prefer to the 
published books (Kaufman 1974, 78). He is criticizing 
Nietzsche's early unpublished essays and lectures, which in
fact should be considered independently of the late notes and
with much more weight, for they are finished works in their 
own right, and not nearly as questionable as the unused
notes.
Breazeale and Schlechta disagree with Hollingdale's 
criticism, and have given evidence to suggest that Nietzsche 
may in fact have had reasons to withhold from publication 
certain early works. They point out that while the books 
Nietzsche published prior to Human, All-too-Human are very 
different in tone and style from what came afterwards, a 
comparison of the early unpublished essays to the later books
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does not reveal any discontinuity in Nietzsche's thought and 
development (Breazeale 1979, xlix; Schlechta 1972, 142). 
According to Schlechta, the early unpublished writings are
more representative of the "real" Nietzsche than are the 
published writings of the same time period. He suggests that 
in the period before the publication of Human, All-too-Human
there was an "unofficial" but "authentic" Nietzsche whose
main philosophical ideas were concealed from view by the 
pessimistic and largely ambivalent "official" works he was 
publishing at the time (1972, 142). This claim is also made 
by Breazeale, and both cite the preface (written in September 
1886) to the second volume of Human, A11-too-Human, where
Nietzsche writes, "When I expressed my reverence for the 
great Arthur Schopenhauer ... I no longer believed in 'a 
single blessed thing', as the people say, not even in 
Schopenhauer. It was precisely at this time that I
formulated an essay, 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral
Sense', which I kept secret" (H II, Preface, 209). In this 
later preface, Nietzsche might merely be taking advantage of 
the opportunity to amend his earlier work, so his comment 
should not be accepted without question. The statement in 
question intimates that when he wrote Human, All-too-Human, 
he had a private side which was at odds with what he was
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voicing to the public. It is possible that these doubts were 
not present at the time he wrote the book and were merely 
expressed in hindsight; but he does refer to a specific 
unpublished work, "On Truth and Lie," which was written in 
1873. Schlechta believes that the early unpublished essays 
were written by the authentic Nietzsche, who had not yet 
found his public voice. It was only in these early essays 
that Nietzsche found "his specific theme and consequently his 
specific language. It is already the theme and language of 
the later Nietzsche, the Nietzsche of Human, All-too-Human
onwards, the real Nietzsche!" (Schlechta 1972, 142). Thus
Schlechta shows that though there may be a break in the style 
of Nietzsche's published works beginning with Human, All-too- 
Human , his later thought and style were already present in 
the early material which remained private. One may also 
point out that the unpublished lectures and essays are more 
than scattered, unfinished notes; they are complete works. 
There may have been no reason to publish a lecture or an 
essay, and so Nietzsche focused on larger projects which 
often incorporated the ideas previously explored in his 
essays and lectures.
Rather than rejecting the ideas in his unpublished 
writings, as Hollingdale suggests he did, Nietzsche salvaged
7
them for use in his published books. In the introductory 
essay to his translations in Philosophy and Truth: Selections
from Nietzsche's Notebooks from the Early 1870's, Breazeale 
writes that, "Like Robinson Crusoe supplying himself from the 
wreck of his ship, Nietzsche appears to have turned again and 
again over the years to his notebooks of the early 1870's, 
returning as it were to the original source of many of his 
thoughts and the original exposition of many of his themes" 
(1979, lii). Though one should not ignore the fact that
Nietzsche let his early writings go unpublished, one cannot
assume that the reason they were left unpublished is that
Nietzsche later rejected their content. As Breazeale points 
out, one need only compare the unpublished works with the 
published books in order to dispel this line of reasoning 
(Breazeale 1979, li). It is uncommon for authors to publish 
everything they write, and the fact that Nietzsche published 
only some of his projects does not necessarily mean that 
those withheld from the public are any less representative of
his views.
Stephen F. Hershbell, in his article "Nietzsche and
Heraclitus," says that "a specific problem [in interpreting 
Nietzsche's relationship with Heraclitus] arises from the
fact that most of Nietzsche's explicit references to
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Heraclitus come from his early philological work" (1979, 18). 
Because Hershbell discounts Nietzsche's early essays as 
problematic, he is hesitant to employ them in demonstrating 
the enduring significance of Heraclitus in Nietzsche's 
thought. He even criticizes Richard Oehler for "quot[ing] 
indiscriminately from Nietzsche's notes rather than from the
finished works, thus obviating any sort of context within
which one could understand the influence of Heraclitus"
(1979, 17). Although Nietzsche's unpublished essays of the 
early 1870's should not take the place of his published 
works, they are indispensable to a study of the origin and 
development of Nietzsche's thought. These early works 
contain "the first sketches of many ideas which only appeared 
in Nietzsche's published writings many years later" 
(Breazeale, xlix; Schlechta, 142), and these first sketches
of Nietzsche's ideas are closer to the original source of his 
philosophy than are the more polished versions in his later 
works. Even though technically philological in nature,
Nietzsche's early studies of the Greeks contain the
foundation of the philosophical ideas which are not refined 
and published until later, when Nietzsche deliberately 
presents himself as a philosopher.
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A central theme in Nietzsche's philosophy which is 
grounded in his study of the Greeks is the theme of culture. 
"If there is any theme unquestioningly audible in everything 
that Nietzsche wrote it is the theme of culture, the problem
of civilization..." (Breazeale 1979, xxvii). The search for
ways to prevent the downfall of mankind "occupied the center 
of Nietzsche's attentions in his later books; but in the 
early published and unpublished writings his main concern was 
with the prior task of determining the general nature and 
precondition of culture as such and its relation to other 
forces" (Breazeale 1979, xxviii). The theme of culture is a 
prominent concern in the whole of Nietzsche's thought, around 
which his main philosophical ideas are constructed.
One unpublished essay I will examine in chapter two is
"Homer's Contest," one of Nietzsche's "Five Forewords to 
Unwritten Books." In this early essay, written in 1872, 
Nietzsche compares the Greek way of life to the modern. He
focuses on examining the Greek contest as the ground of 
Hellenic culture in general, and on pointing to the danger of
its absence in the decadent modern world. This philological 
essay encapsulates Nietzsche's vision of modern culture. A
similar understanding of this essay is expressed by Ernst
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Vogt in his article "Nietzsche und der Wettkampf Homers."
Vogt says of "Homer's Contest": "In a few pages Nietzsche 
gives a sketch of early Greek culture, which by way of 
suggestion anticipates the essential thought of his later 
doctrine, so that the essay assumes a certain key position 
between pure philological work and philosophical work" (1962,
112). Walter Kaufmann translates most of "Homer's Contest"
in The Portable Nietzsche, and mentions in the book's
introduction that this "fragment ... should be of greater 
help for an understanding both of Nietzsche's early 
conception of ancient Greece and of his subsequent 
intellectual development" (1988, 2). Arthur Danto cites the 
essay when writing on Nietzsche's aesthetics, to support his 
claim that "Greek art, like Greek religion, was then a 
contrivance for coping with and finally accepting life
instead of its abbreviation or extinction. The idea here is
one quite central to Nietzsche's thought, and it has
application to all of culture, not to the Greeks alone"
(1965, 52). Breazeale, in his article "The Hegel-Nietzsche 
Problem," makes brief reference to "Homer's Contest" when 
criticizing Deleuze's notion that playful creativity rather 
than struggle and conflict is the expression of the will to 
power. He writes, "What Nietzsche called for was not the
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overcoming of struggle, but rather the overcoming of the 
spirit of vengeance which so often accompanies it. This idea
is already present in the very early essay Homers Wettkampf,
and is encountered again in almost everything Nietzsche wrote
thereafter" (1975, 161).
Nietzsche's belief that struggle is the life blood of 
society came from his study of Greek civilization. He views 
civilization as sustaining itself with the constant tension
between different natures in a Heraclitean world of flux.
Breazeale writes that, "Nietzsche's fundamental idea of
culture ... is not [of] an artificial homogeneity imposed by 
external restraints or ascetic self denial, but [of] an 
organic unity cultivated on the very soil of discord and 
difference" (1979, xxvii). Though Breazeale does not mention 
it specifically, the "soil of discord and difference" is also 
the foundation of Heraclitus's cosmos. Hershbell points out 
that, "Nietzsche's emphasis on strife ... is similar to and 
no doubt influenced by Heraclitus's conception" (1979, 23).
One difference between Nietzsche's early and late 
writings that is of particular interest here is that though 
Nietzsche explicitly mentions the name of Heraclitus often in 
his early notes, he very rarely does so in his later books.
Giuliano Campioni concludes that "In early times Nietzsche
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found the teachings of Heraclitus to be important; however 
his fascination was soon put aside" (1987, 209). There is
another explanation than this for why Nietzsche neglected to 
mention Heraclitus in his later works. Arthur H. Knight
suggests that Nietzsche was being insincere in refusing to
acknowledge his sources (1933, 111). It is probable that 
Nietzsche felt such a kinship with Heraclitus that references 
to him would be superfluous. Nietzsche habitually invoked 
the names of various great thinkers, but it was his tendency 
to absorb aspects of their thought into his own rather than 
treating them as external to his own thought. In his study 
of Nietzsche's readings in romanticism, Adrian Del Caro 
writes, "Since he generally rejected a given influence, even 
one he had embraced with passion, Nietzsche's dialogue with 
others remains very one-sided. The 'previous thoughts' with 
which he associated his reading encounters were those of a 
restless, growing agenda, which over the years became his 
philosophy, his contributions, and his life" (1989, 34). Del
Caro also discusses the influences of several individuals
whose writings are treated by Nietzsche in some context, but 
which are not cited (1989, 35ff.). It is interesting that in 
Ecce Homo, which was written during Nietzsche's last
productive year, and in which he analyzes the development of
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his own ideas, Heraclitus is the only thinker mentioned who 
"might" have previously taught some of Nietzsche's concepts 
(EH, "The Birth of Tragedy," §3, 274). The absence of any 
specific reference to Heraclitus in Nietzsche's later 
writings does not demonstrate his absence from Nietzsche's
thought.
Heraclitus's influence can be seen not only in
Nietzsche's early explorations of the theme of culture, but 
also in his later conceptions of the will to power, the 
eternal recurrence, and the overman. Ofelia Schutte, while 
noting both the early origin of the will to power in 
Nietzsche's philological works and the Heraclitean nature of 
the concept, writes, "Long before Nietzsche thought of the 
term 'will to power' to designate the reality of all that is 
in flux, he had already argued in favor of Heraclitus's 
conception of existence [in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of 
the Greeks 1" ( 1984, 40). Hershbell also mentions the 
Heraclitean nature of the will to power when he says, "Like 
Heraclitus, Nietzsche believed that 'all is one'. He, too, 
saw a basic unity in all things and posited a single 
directive, dynamic principle: der Wille zur Macht" (1979, 
23). In his essay, "The Relation between Nietzsche's Theory 
of the Will to Power and His Earlier Conception of Power,"
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Willard Mittleman writes, "Nietzsche's claim that the world
is nothing but will to power means, basically, that the world 
consists solely of the flux of various centers of force, or 
power, which are constantly seeking to overcome, or
appropriate, each other..." (1980, 135). Though Mittleman
does not specifically mention Heraclitus, his description of 
the will to power as a cosmological doctrine is very
Heraclitean indeed. The doctrine is based on the affirmation
of change and strife, as well as the denial of absolute
being.
The eternal recurrence has also been described as a
cosmological doctrine. Jerry H. Combee, like Mittleman, does 
not specifically mention Heraclitus, but he does ground the 
eternal recurrence in a particularly Heraclitean cosmos: 
"...the idea of eternal recurrence gives the lie to any 
notion of the world having a purpose, meaning, or final state 
of any kind; consequently, the responsibility for whatever 
meaning the universe is to have must be borne by man, whose 
every act has occurred and will occur again an infinite 
number of times" (Combee 1974, 40). Though Combee does not 
point out the Heraclitean foundation of the eternal 
recurrence, one can see that as a moral theory it is grounded
in a Heraclitean universe. Hershbell writes, "The Eternal
15
Recurrence is the apotheosis of the affirmation of the whole 
world of becoming..." (1979, 34). Nietzsche's Heraclitean 
world is one in which there is no absolute being, only the 
constant struggle between opposites and the temporary 
ascendancy of one over the other. Every state of affairs in 
this cosmos is temporary, and in turn it will be overcome by 
its counterpart, and then rise again, in a never-ending
cycle.
This is the climate out of which the overman is born.
He must continually renew the struggle to overcome himself.
Hershbell makes the connection between the overman and the
Heraclitean world of strife: "Like Heraclitus, Nietzsche 
developed an ethical basis for men that springs from his 
basic perception of the phusis.... Nietzsche subsequently
sees the Ubermensch as one who has overcome himself. The
process of overcoming has as its basis strife and opposition" 
(Hershbell 1979, 25). Though Nietzsche abandons the overman 
after Zarathustra, the same characteristics are present in 
the "new philosophers" which take the place of the more 
abstract, idealized concept of the overman. Mittleman 
observes the Heraclitean nature of Nietzsche's "Dionysian 
individual," when he writes, "Since life, according to 
Nietzsche, simply is the struggle and conflict of contending
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wills to power, it follows that the Dionysian individual 
affirms strife and conflict. This furnishes an understanding 
of Nietzsche's high estimation of Heraclitus..." (1980, 140). 
Nietzsche's great individual is one who has affirmed the
Heraclitean world of becoming; he accepts the constant 
struggle within, and is elevated by it.
By examining the overman, the eternal recurrence, and 
the will to power in light of Heraclitus, the vital link
between them can be observed. This connection within
Nietzsche's thought is not otherwise available. Richard 
Perkins writes that, "there is no 'true' Nietzsche lurking
behind dark veils to reveal or to conceal his inner nature.
The man himself is but a series of masks: and his philosophy,
but an endless succession of caves behind caves. His name is 
'Legion': for he is many" (Perkins 1977, 206). Breazeale 
writes, "It seems to be one of Nietzsche's stylistic aims to
obscure the close connection between his various themes, to
present his thoughts on various subjects as if they were 
independent of each other" (1979, xlix). It is one thing to 
say, as Breazeale does, that Nietzsche conceals the unity of 
his thought behind various masks, and quite another to 
conclude, as Perkins does, that Nietzsche is nothing more
than the sum of his various masks. While it is true that
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Nietzsche denies the possibility of final and absolute truth 
and believes in a multiplicity of truths (Perkins 1977, 205), 
Perkins's conclusion that Nietzsche's thought is therefore 
only a series of perceptions is extreme. Kofman suggests
that the kind of obscurity which shrouds both Nietzsche and
Heraclitus disappears when one is guided through their works
by an initiate with a key (1987, 40). According to Schutte, 
the key to clarifying Nietzsche's thought is to approach what 
he wrote from his Dionysian perspective on existence (1984, 
x). Nietzsche's Dionysian perspective is essential to his 
later thought, but it is Heraclitus who is present at its 
origin. Alan Schrift, quoting Fink, says: "Heraclitus 
remains the originary root of Nietzsche's philosophy" (Fink 
1968, 63; Schrift 1990, 13).
In trying to connect Nietzsche's various theories to 
one another, Hershbell (1979, 38) and Combee (1974, 39) note 
that Nietzsche's ethical and metaphysical theories are 
interwoven. Hershbell even points out that Heraclitus's own 
ethical advice was also tied to his physical theory (1979,
38). When Nietzsche's ideas are seen as products of his 
particular world-view, the similarities between them no 
longer remain hidden. The common Heraclitean foundation of
Nietzsche's theories is indicated by Schutte in her search
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for a line of continuity in Nietzsche between metaphysics and 
psychology. "From a metaphysical angle," she writes, "the
will to power was not the only name that Nietzsche gave to
the Heraclitean world of flux. He also called it 'the
innocence of becoming', 'my "beyond good and evil"', and 'the 
eternal recurrence of all things'" (1984, 58).
While one should be careful not to oversimplify 
Heraclitus's influence on Nietzsche by finding it everywhere 
in Nietzsche's work, that influence is something which can be 
found behind his thought in general; both at its conception 
in his earliest writings and at its refined state in his 
later books. A Heraclitean world-view is the underlying
connection between the various ideas of Nietzsche's
philosophy. It is the will to power which stirs the overman 
to greatness, and which serves as the force behind the world 
of becoming. The overman limits and structures his ambition 
in that he accepts the eternal nature of his struggle.
Neither a final state of being nor any absolute values can be
possessed by the overman, because the contest between
opposing forces never reaches a conclusion. There is no
static state of being—only the eternal cycle in which 
opponents are in turn defeated and victorious: the eternal
recurrence of the same.
CHAPTER TWO
NIETZCHE'S STUDY OF ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT
Nietzsche's attraction to Heraclitus can be traced to
his early affinity for ancient Greek thought. As a student
at Bonn and Leipzig (1864-1868) Nietzsche studied classical
philology. Before completing his Doctorate he was given a
professorship of classical philology at the University of
Basel where he taught from 1869-1879, resigning because of
his failing health (Kaufmann 1974, 24). Although he was not
a philosopher by profession during this time, it is
significant that he devoted so much of his career to studying
the ancient Greeks. The importance of this period for
Nietzsche's thought is rarely given sufficient attention when
examining his subsequent philosophical development. His
philological works are particularly relevant to a comparison
of Nietzsche and Heraclitus, but not only for the obvious
reason that Heraclitus is an ancient Greek philosopher. Only
by examining these works do we see the reason why Nietzsche
was so attracted to Heraclitus's philosophy. In Heraclitus
he found an affirmation of precisely what he loved about the
19
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ancient Greek way of life, its most fundamental concept: the
contest.
Even in his earliest years as a professor at Basel,
Nietzsche criticized the traditional scholarly approach to 
ancient texts. In his inaugural address he warned that if 
one searches with the eye of traditional scholarship, one
always loses "that wonderful creative force ... of the
atmosphere of antiquity" (KG II, vol. 1, 252). He called to 
his new colleagues not to "forget that passionate emotion 
which instinctively drove our meditation and enjoyment back 
to the Greeks" (KG II, vol. 1, 252). Nietzsche's own
examination of Greek thought goes beyond a linguistic or 
historical analysis of the fragmentary texts. He focuses 
instead on reconstructing the ancient authors so that they 
might speak for themselves about their way of life. In his 
early essay Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks
(1873), Nietzsche literally gives voice to the Presocratic 
philosophers, by writing down words for them and even putting 
these utterances in quotation marks. With this unique way of
listening to the Greeks, Nietzsche tries to uncover the way 
of life which formed the foundation of their philosophical 
systems. He is not merely interested in determining the 
meaning of these ancient texts, rather he wants to recreate
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and promote a certain world-view. He believes that the way 
of life which existed in ancient times is still a possibility 
for us today, and that it is the purpose of philosophy to 
revive this way of looking at humanity and the world in order
to halt the decay of our own society. "This way of living
and of looking at human matters was there once in any case, 
and so is still possible: the [individual philosopher's] 
'system' is the growth from out of this soil" (PTG, Preface, 
23; cf. JGB §6, 203). Any philosophical system, whether it 
is true or not, was generated and nurtured by the soil of
life which surrounded it, and so contains the secret of the
ground out of which it grew. One can discover the life of 
the individual philosopher by examining his philosophical 
system, "just as one may guess at the nature of the soil in a
given place by studying a plant that grows there" (PTG, 
Preface, 23). Nietzsche's love of the Greek way of life may 
have arisen out of his contempt for modern society, or 
perhaps it was the study of the Greeks that gave shape and 
focus to his contempt. Either way, his philological studies 
are closely connected with his philosophical criticism of 
modern society. Nietzsche the philosopher was originally 
Nietzsche the philologist, and to set the two apart is to
22
lose the sense of purpose and unity behind his philosophic
thought.
Nietzsche views the ancient Greek texts as living 
things, and every living thing requires an atmosphere in
which to flourish. He believed that the Presocratic
cosmologies have become "hard and barren" over the millennia, 
because by greedily devouring the trivial workings of their 
texts, modern scholarship has condemned the ancient geniuses 
to withstand the bright light of a sun devoid of a protective 
atmosphere (U II, §7, 95). Nietzsche finds himself connected 
throughout the millennia with these ancient individuals. He 
considers himself the "pupil of earlier times, especially the 
Hellenic;" and he wants history to provide him with untimely 
insights that would act against the present age, and have a 
positive effect on coming ages (U II, Preface, 60). By
looking to the past for examples with which to improve the 
weak and lifeless modern humanity, he hopes to gain "a place 
of honor in the temple of history" from which to teach and
admonish those to come after him (U II, §2, 68). His premise
is that what had the power to expand and beautify humanity in 
the past must still have the power to do so in the present (U
II, §2, 68).
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Nietzsche is particularly interested in Heraclitus, for
in him he finds one "in whose proximity I feel warmer and 
better than anywhere else" (EH, "The Birth of Tragedy," §3, 
273). Heraclitus is not "Heraclitus the Obscure," but a 
philosopher whose style is more lucid and luminous than 
almost anyone else's; an unimaginably proud philosopher who 
lives in solitude and completely without concern for anything 
in the here and now (PTG §8, 65-66). Like Nietzsche,
Heraclitus considers himself to be among the great
individuals. He criticizes the masses (DK 104), saying,
"What discernment or intelligence do they possess? They 
place their trust in popular bards, and take the throng for 
their teacher, not realizing that 'the majority are bad, and 
only few are good'" (Robinson 1987, 61-63). Heraclitus fits 
Nietzsche's model for greatness, for he distinguishes himself 
from the herd, with the result that his writings are hidden 
from their lower level of intelligence. Nietzsche writes,
"All the nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when 
they wish to communicate; and choosing that, one at the same 
time erects barriers against 'the others'.... All the more 
subtle laws of any style have their origin at this point: 
they at the same time keep away, create a distance, forbid 
'entrance', understanding, as said above—while they open the
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ears of those whose ears are related to ours" (FW §381, 343).
Nietzsche is a fellow inhabitant of Heraclitus's ancient
cosmos, in which modern humanity's call for equality is the 
battle cry only of stasis and death itself.
Throughout his philosophical works Nietzsche criticizes
the modern-day concept of humanity, which fatally excludes 
the notion of struggle and is detrimental to life itself.
The goal of modern humanity is to reduce all individuals to 
the same level, that is, to close the gap between differences
and eliminate tension and struggle. This central theme also
dominates Nietzsche's study of the Greeks. Tension is the
force behind the very existence of the Greek individual and
the Greek state, as well as Heraclitus's cosmos. In Beyond
Good and Evil, Nietzsche says that modern thinkers mistakenly
see in the older forms of society the causes of all human
misery and failure, and strive to achieve the "green-pasture 
happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, 
comfort, and an easier life for everyone" (JGB §44, 244). 
While modern man wants to alleviate suffering, severity, 
everything terrible and predatory, Nietzsche says that 
"everything in him that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents 
serves the enhancement of the species 'man' as much as its 
opposite does" (JGB §44, 244). This very thought is
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expressed in the early unpublished essay, "Homer's Contest." 
There Nietzsche writes that man's "terrible aptitudes, 
construed as inhuman, are perhaps even the fertile soil out
of which alone all humanity in its stirrings, deeds, and 
actions, can grow forth" (KS I, 783). The Greeks see the 
horrible strengths of man "not as a defect, but as the effect
of a beneficent godhead" (KS I, 787). In Greek society, 
humanity's most terrible qualities are controlled by the 
rule-governed contest. The Greeks' lust for annihilation is 
bounded by their desire to benefit Athens, which supersedes 
the desire for personal glory and gain.
Instead of harnessing mankind's hostile desires, modern 
humanity wants to stamp them out as inhuman, and seeks to 
eliminate them as the cause of human misery. The Christian 
Church, for example, orders extermination of the passions; 
its cure for them is castration. But just as "we no longer 
admire dentists who pull out the teeth to stop them hurting" 
(G-D §1, 42), the Church exercises extreme folly when it 
attacks the passions at their roots. To do this is "to
attack life at its roots: the practice of the Church is
hostile to life..." (G-D §1, 42). The modern morality of 
helping one's neighbor is based on the decaying instincts of 
a weak age, in which "everyone is to a certain degree an
26
invalid and everyone a nurse" (G-D §37, 90). Every strong 
age, however, is characterized by pathos of distance—"the
chasm between man and man, class and class, the multiplicity 
of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out" (G-D §37,
91). Nietzsche says we should live at war with our neighbor, 
because tension, envy and competition produce everything 
which is great in humanity. The never-ending contest for 
fame and glory, the struggle toward greatness, that is, 
toward the spiritualization of everything predatory in man, 
is precisely what is absent in the soft, overstuffed, weak- 
willed herd morality of modern humanity. Heraclitus 
expressed it this way (DK 29): "The best choose one thing in 
place of all things—ever-flowing glory among mortals. The 
majority, however, glut themselves like cattle" (Robinson
1987, 85).
The concept that competition is essential to life is 
prominent in Heraclitus's philosophy. The following passage 
from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks sums up
Nietzsche's perception of the role of the Greek contest as 
the fundamental thought behind Heraclitus's cosmos:
It is a wonderful idea, welling up from the purest 
springs of Hellenism, the idea that strife embodies 
the everlasting sovereignty of strict justice, 
bound to everlasting laws. Only a Greek was ca­
pable of finding such an idea to be the fundament 
of a cosmology; it is Hesiod's good Eris
transformed into the cosmic principle; it is the
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contest idea of the Greek individual and the Greek 
state, taken from the gymnasium and the palaestra, 
from the artist's agon, from the contest between 
political parties and between cities—all trans­
formed into universal application so that now the 
wheels of the cosmos turn on it. (PTG §5, 55)
This passage closely parallels the essay "Homer's 
Contest," which was written one year previously. In "Homer's 
Contest" Nietzsche paints a picture of the Greek contest as 
the "noblest Hellenic fundamental thought" (KS I, 792). He 
explains that there are two goddesses of envy in Greek 
mythology. One is thought of as evil because she promotes 
hostile battles of annihilation among men. The other goddess 
is considered to be good for mankind, for she motivates men 
to compete among themselves. Talent and genius unfold only 
in competition with others, just as "in the natural order of 
things there are always several geniuses who mutually spur
themselves to action and hold themselves within the borders
of measure" (KS I, 789). The most important restriction on 
the competition is that no one shall be the best, for if one 
individual were to rise above all other opponents, then "the 
contest would dry up, and the perpetual soil of life for the 
Hellenic state would be endangered" (KS I, 788). If the
state is to survive, the contest must endure. In the same
way, the ascendancy of one opposite over the other in
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Heraclitus's cosmos can never be maintained without constant
strife.
The affirmation of tension and struggle appears in
Nietzsche's later works as the doctrine of the will to power.
The Greek contest provides the historical basis upon which
Nietzsche later builds his prescription for the present age: 
that "the struggle, great and small, everywhere turns on
ascendancy, on growth and extension, in accordance with the 
will to power, which is precisely the will of life" (FW §349, 
230). An historical basis for the will to power has also 
been identified as Schopenhauer's will to live. In 1865, 
when Nietzsche was studying philology in Leipzig, he bought a 
copy of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation 
at a second-hand bookstore (Kaufmann 1974, 24). There is a 
passage in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873) 
in which Nietzsche seems to criticize Schopenhauer after 
praising Heraclitus's concept of strife and the Greek 
contest. He writes that "the basic tone of [Schopenhauer's 
description of strife] is quite different from that which 
Heraclitus offers, because strife for Schopenhauer is a proof
of the internal self-dissociation of the Will to Live, which
is seen as a self-consuming, menacing, and gloomy drive, a 
thoroughly frightful and by no means blessed phenomenon" (PTG
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§5, 56). In this passage, Nietzsche affirms Heraclitean 
strife which is interpreted as an ordering force as opposed 
to Schopenhauer's strife which is a sign of dissociation. It 
would seem that although Schopenhauer's philosophy had a
significant impact on Nietzsche, Heraclitus provided a closer 
model for his own concept of the will to power.
According to Nietzsche, the will to power is the most 
fundamental force. He writes that the world is will to power 
and nothing else (JGB §36, 238); it is the sustaining force 
behind greatness, as well as the unrefined animosity and envy 
which propel an individual to the height of glory. The will 
to power, though, is not an isolated force; the furious drive 
must have a direction and purpose in order for one to avoid 
self destruction. "He whom the flames of jealousy surround 
at last turns his poisoned sting against himself, like the 
scorpion..." (Z., "Of Joys and Passions," 64-65). What limits 
and controls the will to power? The passage just quoted from 
Zarathustra concludes, "Man is something that must be
overcome." It is the overman, and later the new
philosophers, who are able to harness the will to power and
to re-direct this otherwise destructive force that is within
mankind.
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In the same way, the Greek contest was more than an
uncontrolled desire for battle. The Greek individual's
struggle for fame was limited by his desire to bring glory to
Athens; "he wanted to increase her fame in his own" (KS I,
789). This love of his mother city inflamed his ambition, 
and at the same time directed it and kept it contained. In 
this way, says Nietzsche, "the individuals in antiquity were 
freer because their limits were nearer and more tangible. 
Modern man, on the other hand, is everywhere crossed by 
infinity, like the quick-footed Achilles in the parable of 
the Eleatic, Zeno: infinity hinders him, he cannot even catch 
up to the tortoise" (KS I, 790). The Greeks embrace their 
jealousy and animosity, and overcome these apparently 
terrible characteristics by controlling them with a rule-
governed contest, whereas modern ambition has no focus. In 
the same way Heraclitus's universe consists of opposites 
which strive for dominion, but not blindly. The competing 
forces never annihilate their opponent, but are ordered by 
the logos, which guarantees an eternal contest of coming to 
be and passing away. Strife is essential to Heraclitus's 
cosmos, but his universe is not kept in existence by wars of 
annihilation. The power behind Heraclitus's cosmos is
governed and limited by a rule-ordered contest of forces, but
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the rules are not absolute; "they are inviolable laws and
standards that are immanent in the struggle" (PTG §5, 55).
This would be Nietzsche's interpretation of Heraclitus's
fragment DK 30: "The ordered world, the same for all, no god
or man made, but it always was, is, and will be, an
everliving fire, being kindled in measures and being put out 
in measures" (Robinson 1987, 25).
The Greek individual is one who has overcome himself,
who has successfully striven to transform his passions into 
something sublime. Like Nietzsche's overman, he has become 
his own creator, forever in the process of becoming who he 
is. "What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a 
goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a qoinq- 
across..." (Z I, Prologue, 3). The "range between extremes,"
"tension," and "pathos of distance" are essential in both 
instances, and are necessary to prevent the weakening of the 
individual and the state (G-D §37, 91). Tension and 
overcoming are also vital to Heraclitus's cosmos, in which 
nothing is in a state of being; it is only by virtue of 
strife that anything has the semblance of permanence. 
Heraclitus says (DK 8) that "'what opposes unites', and that 
the finest attunement stems from things bearing in opposite
directions, and that all things come about by strife"
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(Robinson 1987, 15). There is no solid ground of being
beneath man's feet, and so humanity, like the cosmos itself,
must continually re-define itself and create its own
boundaries and set of rules. Similarly, Nietzsche wrote,
"...this world has a 'necessary' and 'calculable' course, not 
because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely 
lacking, and every power draws its ultimate consequences at
every moment" (JGB §22, 220).
According to the Greek contest, Heraclitean strife, and 
Nietzsche's will to power, a balancing out of forces is never 
achieved. A state of equilibrium is never reached, for if 
all forces were equalized, the struggle which fuels all 
existence would die out. The Greek contest, the everliving 
fire, and the passionate struggle must never be extinguished; 
opposing forces must continue the battle, each overcoming the 
other in turn, for all eternity. This is the basis of
Nietzsche's eternal recurrence. The Greek individual must
never think his opponent defeated, for this would lead to his
own swift downfall and, therefore, to the end of the contest
and of life itself. In the same way, the overman is in a 
constant state of becoming; the morality he creates does not 
become absolute, but must continuously be infused with new 
ideas. "Unchanging good and evil does not exist! From out
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of themselves they must overcome themselves again and again"
(Z., "Of Self Overcoming," 139). The eternal recurrence of
the same allows for continuous affirmation of life in the
absence of any final state or absolute truth. Like the Greek
contest and the Heraclitean logos, the eternal recurrence
signifies the order and pattern inherent in all coming to be 
and passing away. It calls for the perpetuation of conflict 
and of overcoming; it warns against the illusion of being, 
and affirms the present world with an eye to the future, 
which is continually being created here and now.
The study of the Greeks for Nietzsche was much more 
than an academic exercise. His early essays on the Greeks in 
which he compares ancient and modern humanity form the very 
foundation of what he later calls his philosophical thought. 
In "Homer's Contest," Nietzsche gives his full attention to
what he found to be the source of life itself for the Greeks,
namely, the contest; and he criticizes modern humanity as 
being unable even to comprehend this concept (see KS I, 784, 
787, 789-90). In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, 
he interprets Heraclitus's strife in connection with the 
Greek contest. The criticism of modern humanity as weak and 
decadent is repeated as a central theme in his later works.
In the Greek contest and Heraclitus's cosmos, Nietzsche finds
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what is absent in modern man: the harnessing of so-called 
"inhuman" qualities, the affirmation of struggle and strife; 
in short, the acceptance of life itself.
CHAPTER THREE
NIETZSCHE'S INTERPRETATION OF HERACLITUS
What can be said about the similarity between 
Nietzsche's philosophy and that of Heraclitus? Nietzsche 
believes that he has found a predecessor in Heraclitus, but
his interpretation of the Heraclitean fragments has been 
challenged, most notably by Martin Heidegger. If Nietzsche's 
interpretation of Heraclitus is shown to be biased or 
incorrect, the similarities that he saw between his own views 
and those of Heraclitus would still provide insight into his 
own philosophy. It is nonetheless interesting to compare his 
interpretation with that of others. Heidegger in particular 
has a very different view of Heraclitus, which in the end 
affects his understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy as well.
According to Heidegger, all of the Greek thinkers speak 
in the language of being. Even "Heraclitus, to whom is 
ascribed the doctrine of becoming as diametrically opposed to 
Parmenides' doctrine of being, says the same as Parmenides" 
(Heidegger 1959, 97). Nietzsche is mislead, says Heidegger, 
by traditional interpretations which portray Heraclitus and 
Parmenides in opposition to one another (Heidegger 1959,
126). Nietzsche's adherence to the tradition in this 
respect, says Heidegger, leads to an interpretation of
35
36
Heraclitus which puts too much emphasis on change (becoming) 
and does not assign enough importance to the logos (being).
My thesis does not hinge on Nietzsche's interpretation 
being correct or not. As Sarah Kofman writes, "What is at
stake in [the confrontation between Heidegger and Nietzsche] 
is not the 'philological' truth or falsity of this or that 
translation or interpretation of such and such a fragment of 
Heraclitus, but a whole conception of philosophy, of its 
history, of thought, language, textuality, and translation" 
(Kofman 1987, 39). Nietzsche and Heidegger have different 
approaches to the Greek texts, differences that can be traced 
back to their reasons for wanting to incorporate these texts 
into their own thought. While Nietzsche is interested in 
discovering the possibilities for life which existed for the 
text's author, Heidegger wants to uncover a possibility that 
"was unthought by the Greeks, but is now ... made possible 
for us to think" (Maly and Emad 1986, 7). The two approaches 
are similar in that both thinkers are trying to recover a way 
of thinking from the past that has a meaning for us in our 
own time. Both thinkers find something in the ancient Greek
world that is missing in society today, to its detriment.
The direction the two methods take, however, is reversed.
Nietzsche uses the study of the Greeks as a starting point
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for his own philosophic thought. The approach to life as a 
perpetual contest is an idea which is first uncovered as the 
basis of Greek life and which is then incorporated into 
Nietzsche's prescription for modern humanity. Heidegger's 
approach to the Greeks, however, is influenced by his own
idea of being as the most fundamental concept. Heidegger 
finds all of the early Greek thinkers speaking in terms of 
the language of being, a language which he says has been 
ignored by the tradition prior to him. Heidegger criticizes 
Nietzsche's method of trying to uncover the thinking that was 
unique to philosophers of the past because that method 
ignores the progression of the history of thought (Kofman 
1987, 52). Heidegger himself does not seem concerned with 
what the Greeks said in the past, but only with what they 
could possibly say to us today. This fundamental difference 
in interpretive style leads to widely divergent views of
Heraclitus.
While Nietzsche sees in him an affirmation of the will
to power, of strife and tension and overcoming, Heidegger 
makes Heraclitus say the word being. Correspondingly, 
tension and struggle are what Nietzsche finds missing in 
modern society, while Heidegger prescribes being. His most 
textually oriented disagreement with Nietzsche's
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interpretation centers around the concept of flux. He 
writes, "The popular interpretation of Heraclitus tends to 
sum up his philosophy in the dictum panta rhei, 'everything 
flows'. If these words stem from Heraclitus to begin with, 
they do not mean that everything is mere continuous and 
evanescent change, pure impermanence; no, they mean that the
essent as a whole, in its being is hurled back and forth from 
one opposition to another; being is the gathering of this 
conflict and unrest" (1959, 134). Heidegger does not think 
Heraclitus meant that all physical things are constantly 
changing, but that there is an element of measure and balance 
in change. This is also the view of G. S. Kirk. The 
fragment most commonly cited to demonstrate Heraclitus' 
belief in continuous change is DK 91, "It is not possible to 
step twice into the same river" (Freeman 1983, 31). This is 
the fragment Nietzsche refers to when he has Heraclitus 
proclaim, "I see nothing other than becoming" (PTG §5, 51). 
Kirk, however, thinks that the river image given in another 
fragment, DK 12, is more representative of Heraclitus' 
concept of flux. It reads, "Those who step into the same 
river have different waters flowing ever upon them" (Freeman
1983, 31; Kirk et al. 1983, 194-197). This fragment
emphasizes that the river is, at least in a sense, the same
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river, even though it is undergoing change. Kirk's 
interpretation of the Heraclitean cosmos is that the world as 
a complex whole retains unity even though its parts are 
forever changing (1983, 197). There is much controversy over 
how to interpret these two fragments; for instance, in 
opposition to Kirk, Guthrie holds the extreme flux view. The 
two fragments are even thought to be incommensurable, and DK 
12 is now considered to be the more genuine expression of 
Heraclitus's thought (Kirk et al. 1983, 196-97; cf. Robinson
1987, 140).
The disagreement over the two river fragments is usually
based on whether one thinks that Heraclitus believed in the
constant change of all physical things or only in eventual 
change. Heidegger accepts the concept of eventual change,
and thus finds an element of being in Heraclitus's cosmos.
In An Introduction to Metaphysics he writes, "For the Greeks
appearing belonged to being, or more precisely that the 
essence of being lay partly in appearing. This has been 
clarified through the supreme possibility of human being, as 
fashioned by the Greeks, through glory and glorification" 
(1959, 103). Nietzsche, though, says the opposite. Once 
being is injected into the struggle for glory, that is, once 
one has reached the highest point of glory and is elevated
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above the contest, his downfall is immanent. Nothing remains 
in a state of being without struggle, just as no opponent can 
remain unchallenged above the contest. Nietzsche writes that 
Heraclitus teaches "the everlasting and exclusive coming-to- 
be, the impermanence of everything actual, which constantly
acts and comes-to-be but never is" (PTG §5, 54). According 
to his view, it is not necessary that everything change 
constantly, or even that it eventually change; it is only 
important that everything is continually in a state of 
coming-to-be. That is, even though what is present to us in 
the world may have the semblance of being, it can never 
arrive at that state because it must constantly struggle to 
maintain its ascendancy lest it be overtaken. To reach a 
state of being is impossible. For Nietzsche, the river image 
is not a symbol for the extreme flux model, rather it is a 
metaphor for time. The point is that nothing "shows a 
tarrying, an indestructibility" (PTG §5, 51). He writes,
"You use names for things as if they rigidly, persistently 
endured; yet even the stream into which you step a second 
time is not the one you stepped into before" (PTG §5, 52). 
Something may remain unchanged for a period of time, but it 
does so not because it possesses being; it does so only 
because it has momentarily ascended above its opponent. "But
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this by no means signifies the end of the war; the contest 
endures in all eternity" (PTG §5, 55). The proclamation that 
everything is constantly becoming does not mean that
everything must always be changing.
Heidegger expresses something similar to what Nietzsche
says when he writes, "Because being as logos is basic 
gathering, not mass and turmoil in which everything has as 
much or as little value as everything else, rank and
domination are implicit in being. If being is to disclose 
itself, it must have and maintain a rank" (1959, 133). He 
writes, "[The logos 1 does not let what it holds in its power 
dissolve into an empty freedom from opposition, but by 
uniting the opposites maintains the full sharpness of their 
tension" (Heidegger 1959, 134). Heidegger finds being in the 
logos, which is a gathering and a harmony. To him the logos 
is the pattern of the hierarchical structure of beings, it is 
the permanent order that gives meaning to the chaos and keeps 
it from falling apart. This is what Heidegger thinks is 
missing from Nietzsche's view of Heraclitus as the
philosopher of becoming. As Nietzsche explains, the logos is 
eternal and unwritten harmony, but not one that imposes
itself on the world of strife from outside; the physical 
world is no longer ruled by a metaphysical one (PTG §5, 51).
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Although Heidegger criticizes Nietzsche for 
overemphasizing becoming in Heraclitus, he also makes the 
attempt to read Nietzsche as if he, too, had been speaking 
the language of being all along. When Heidegger tries to
overturn Nietzsche's concepts to fit into his own
understanding of being, however, Nietzsche's thought is 
completely lost. At one point it seems that the reason for 
having Nietzsche say "Being" is to put him back into the 
company of metaphysicians. Heidegger writes, "The very 
nature of becoming is determined as will to power. Can one 
then still call Nietzsche's thinking a consummation of 
metaphysics? Is it not its denial, or even its overcoming? 
Away from 'Being'—and on to 'Becoming'?" (Heidegger 1987, 
vol. Ill, 155-56). In the following paragraphs he explains
that:
As opposed to all that, we must consider anew what 
will to power means: empowering to the excelling of 
one's own essence. Empowering brings excelling— 
becoming—to a stand and to permanence. In the 
thought of will to power, what is becoming and is 
moved in the highest and most proper sense—life 
itself—is to be thought in its permanence.
This interpretation of Nietzsche ignores the fundamental idea
behind the Greek contest: that it must never end. Once one
contestant rises above all other contestants, once his 
excelling is brought to permanence, his swift downfall has
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already begun. Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche parallels 
his interpretation of Heraclitus's river fragment. In both 
cases there is something which possesses being (the river and 
life itself), yet which is constantly becoming. Life itself, 
which is full of change, is to be thought in its permanence 
in the same way the logos represents the eternal order which
rules over the otherwise chaotic world. Nietzsche's view is
different. According to his interpretation of Heraclitus,
there is no absolute order. Even though the logos is 
eternal, it is created out of and held together by the 
tension between opposites. Nietzsche writes that Heraclitus, 
"could no longer see the contesting pairs and their referees 
as separate; the judges themselves seemed to be striving in 
the contest and the contestants seemed to be judging them.... 
The struggle of the many is pure justice itself!" (PTC §6,
57) .
When Nietzsche is interpreted by Heidegger in terms of 
being, the world becomes something which is powerless to 
create itself. It still retains becoming (Heidegger 1984, 
vol. II, 147), but it also possesses being in a passive way. 
It no longer has to struggle for value and existence. To 
Heidegger, the eternal recurrence is what redeems the world 
from its eternal flux, by injecting being into becoming
44
(Heidegger 1984, vol. II, 144). He says that the eternal 
flux is represented in Nietzsche's philosophy as the will to 
power (1977, 74). The will to power has an essentially 
destructive character (Heidegger 1984, vol. II, 145), and it
is the eternal recurrence that overcomes this eternal flux.
In the end, this kind of overcoming would lead to permanence; 
to the slackening of tension and the alleviation of strife. 
Heidegger uses this interpretation of Nietzsche to show what 
a very peculiar affair his 'Heracliteanism' is.
In Nietzsche's philosophy, constant strife has an
inherent structure in the form of the eternal recurrence, but
the eternal recurrence does not freeze the eternal flow, nor
does it incorporate the ultimate truth. Becoming itself is 
not something to be overcome and injected with being; 
becoming is not a war of annihilation but a rule-governed
contest similar to Heraclitus's cosmos. The eternal
recurrence limits the struggle in the way the logos does, but 
it does not throw any Being into the path of the eternal 
flow, as Heidegger thinks. At best, "That everything recurs 
is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a
world of being" (WM, 617).
It is impossible to reconcile the differences between 
Heidegger and Nietzsche. Their purposes and goals differ too
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much. Nietzsche likes the idea of taking a terrible,
paralyzing thought such as the impermanence of everything and 
transforming it "into sublimity and the feeling of blessed 
astonishment" (PTG §5, 54). The thought that existence has 
no meaning, but recurs inevitably without end, "is the most 
extreme form of nihilism: the nothing (the 'meaningless'), 
eternally!" (WM §55, 36). And yet, Nietzsche perceived this 
thought to be a new source of strength. He writes, "To the 
paralyzing sense of general disintegration and incompleteness 
I opposed the eternal recurrence" (WM §417, 224). This is
the sense in which eternal flux is overcome. It is not
stabilized by being, rather it produces an inherent ordering 
pattern that rises out of the struggle itself. Heidegger, by 
reading an element of being into the picture, disrupts this
cycle of the creative force.
CHAPTER FOUR
ETERNAL RECURRENCE, WILL TO POWER AND OVERMAN
In order to understand how Nietzsche's ideas of the
eternal recurrence, will to power, and overman complement one 
another and work together, it is essential to understand the 
common ground out of which they are developed. A feel for
Nietzsche's method of interpretation will be useful in 
recognizing this common ground, even in the face of his 
reluctance to discuss his sources, and will help to fit these 
ideas into a coherent picture of his thought.
Nietzsche's method of interpretation is much more 
textually oriented than Heidegger's phenomenological 
approach. Instead of searching for a particular insight 
concealed between the lines of a text, as Heidegger does, 
Nietzsche tries to open up a path between us and the author. 
Nietzsche does not attempt to subvert the text in the way 
Heidegger does, yet his approach is not like that of 
traditional scholarship either. His method of interpretation 
goes beyond an objective search for knowledge about the text. 
His aim is to revive the text, to reach an understanding of 
it and an agreement with it (cf. Kofman 1987, 52).
This is the way Nietzsche approaches the ancient Greek 
texts in his earliest philological writings. He interprets
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these texts in order to allow a possibility for life, which 
was present to the Presocratic philosophers, to show itself
to us in modern times. When Nietzsche's texts are
interpreted in the same way that he himself approached a 
text, one can begin to see why he is so reluctant to 
acknowledge his predecessors. The repeated mention of 
Heraclitus without specific acknowledgment of Heraclitus's 
"influence" is a significant feature of this reluctance. 
Nietzsche approaches a text from the standpoint of a fellow 
architect of history. He considers himself to be among the 
great individuals who have understood and shaped history. 
Because of this approach he feels justified in reviving the 
ancient texts within his own philosophical writings, without 
acknowledging the original authors. According to Nietzsche's 
method of interpretation, what is important is not the actual 
text itself (as it would be in a traditional scholarly 
approach), and it is not even the philosophical system 
presented in the text. Nietzsche wants to uncover the 
individual philosopher's way of life, and the intrinsic 
possibility for life that existed in the author's time, which 
is still accessible to us through the text. Nietzsche's
ultimate source is neither the author nor his text. These
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are only the paths that he follows to his original source,
the way of life that was present to the author.
According to this, what intrigued Nietzsche about
Heraclitus was not the specific cosmological system that 
could be pieced together from the fragments of text. Even
when he was writing about Heraclitus explicitly, as in
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche was
interested in the ground in which Heraclitus's ideas were
nurtured. This is why it is so important to look at his 
interpretation of Heraclitus in light of Nietzsche's affinity 
for the Greek contest. When searching for the connection
between the eternal recurrence, the will to power, and the 
overman, it is also helpful to approach Nietzsche's text the 
same way that he approached a text, as being based on a 
particular way of life. When Nietzsche began to write his 
philosophical books, he had already completed his search for 
the foundation of the ancient Greek texts, and it was no 
longer necessary for him to use the texts or to write about 
them. The ways of thinking he had uncovered were now his to 
present to the modern world in his own way. As a result, 
Nietzsche's thought can be interpreted as a reworking of
notions such as Heraclitean strife and the Greek contest, and
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as a repackaging of them for presentation to the modern
world.
Nietzsche's aphoristic style does not leave much room
for the discussion of his predecessors. A mention of various
relevant doctrines similar to his would require too much 
detail and analysis, which would weaken the intuitive impact 
of his works. Nietzsche writes passionately and with a 
purpose; he writes so that the right reader will experience a 
flash of insight. At the same time he wants to exclude the 
wrong readers who could work their way through a lengthy 
argument. In the Forward to The Antichrist, he writes,
"These alone are my readers, my rightful readers, my 
predestined readers: what do the rest matter?—The rest are 
merely mankind.—One must be superior to mankind in force, in 
loftiness of soul—in contempt" (A, Forward, 114). Nietzsche 
writes in a way that he hopes will obscure his thought from 
most, and will reveal it only to the few who are strong 
enough to embrace his ideas. The masses of humanity are not 
strong enough to recognize their freedom, their "will to 
self-responsibility" (G-D §38, 92), and so are not fully
human.
When considering Nietzsche's contempt for the mass of
humanity, it is important to understand what he means by the
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notion of the overman, of the great individual. Unless the 
overman is understood in accordance with Greek thought,
Nietzsche's contempt for the masses can be misconstrued, and 
his views perhaps distorted by his arrogant tone (cf. Schutte 
1984, x). Greatness is measured according to one's
acknowledgement and harnessing of the will to power within 
oneself. According to Nietzsche, it is only the few 
strongest individuals who are able to accept this furious 
drive and contain it. Today, the class of genius is thought
to be an exclusive one. Great individuals are defined
according to what is held in esteem by the mass of society, 
such as wealth, beauty or political power, for example.
These individuals may be resented or feared as being 
invulnerable, since their power is conferred upon them 
according to popular and therefore ontologically irrelevant 
criteria. However, Nietzsche's concept of the great
individual is based on the ancient Greek view that the rank 
of genius is never an exclusive one. The distinction between 
the ancient and modern concepts of the genius is made in 
"Homer's Contest." In order for the contest to continue it 
must be open to several geniuses who compete among
themselves, a thought which "is hostile to the
'exclusiveness' of the genius in the modern sense..." (KS I,
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789). For the Greeks there are no pre-set conditions for
greatness, according to which an exclusive class is measured,
because if the competition were not kept open to different
"weaker" natures, then the contest would degenerate.
Not only must the overman be able to acknowledge and 
direct his will to power, he must at the same time be strong 
enough to live with the most paralyzing, nihilistic thought, 
the eternal recurrence. The eternal recurrence governs the 
world of the overman. The belief that the struggle never 
ends, but eternally turns back upon itself, acts upon him 
like a stimulant. Greatness is not something that can be 
achieved; it can only be sustained through continued strife. 
Only the strongest individuals can acknowledge the never 
ending cycle, the knowledge that there is no final state, no 
absolute goal to be reached. The individuals who can accept 
this are the ones who are willing to set their own limits and 
thus contain and direct their will to power. Only when it is 
acknowledged that there is no final goal or end to life is 
the overman able to embrace his will to power. Without the 
perspective of the eternal recurrence, he is content to play 
out his role in the progression of humanity toward
predetermined goals. When the point of view of the eternal 
recurrence is taken, when there is nothing beyond the endless
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perpetual cycle of events, strong individuals are compelled 
to take on a decisive role. They strive toward the only 
possible goal, which is the eventual return of the cycle to 
the present moment. Like a serpent biting its tail, the 
overman is driven forward by the thought of conquering the 
present again and again.
The overman affirms the moment of joy, and longs for its 
opposite, because he knows that the two are inseparable.
"Pain is also joy, a curse is also a blessing, the night is 
also a sun.... Did you ever say Yes to one joy? O my 
friends, then you said Yes to all woe as well. All things 
are chained and entwined together, all things are in love" (Z 
IV, "The Intoxicated Song," §10, 331). To desire the return 
of joy is also to affirm its eternal struggle with despair, 
for joy cannot exist without its opposite. Because the 
struggle between the two will never end, neither joy nor 
despair will endure, but both will return eternally. Because 
the overman embraces this thought, he can only affirm and
wish for both.
If the eternal recurrence is supposed to act upon the 
will to power as a stimulant, then it is problematic to 
interpret the eternal recurrence as something which adds an 
element of stability to the world of becoming. Heidegger is
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not the only commentator to discover an element of being in 
the eternal recurrence. Kaufman, Danto, and Joan Stambaugh 
also take this view as the starting point from which to 
analyze the eternal recurrence. Danto writes, "In the end, 
there is no passing away and no true becoming in the world. 
There is an eternally frozen mobility" (1968, 211). Kaufman 
writes, "[Nietzsche] thought he had succeeded in creating a 
synthesis of the philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides, 
of the dynamic and the static world-pictures, of being and 
becoming" (1974, 328), and Stambaugh writes, "If finitude is 
understood to mean impermanence, eternal return is that which 
gives permanence to Becoming" (1972, 13). When making these 
statements, Kaufman and Stambaugh both cite the same passage
from the Will to Power as Heidegger does: "that everything
recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to
a world of being" (WM 617, 330).
Each of these commentators progresses from this point in
a different way. Danto sees the eternal recurrence acting on 
the overman as a Kantian categorical imperative. "Stated as 
an imperative: So act (or so be) that you would be willing to 
act exactly the same way (or be exactly the same thing) an 
infinite number of times over" (Danto 1968, 212). This view 
is criticized by Kaufman who explains that Nietzsche is not
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concerned with providing a universal guideline or criterion 
for particular actions (1974, 325). Combee also disagrees 
with Danto's interpretation by pointing out that, "it 
involves acting with recognition of eternal recurrence as a 
fact beyond one's will" (1974, 40). If the eternal
recurrence is to be interpreted as an universal criterion or
fact, then it is no longer a nihilistic thought. Kaufman 
draws a more compatible conclusion, which is that the overman 
finds eternity in the moment (1974, 328). Kaufman criticizes 
Nietzsche's notion of the return, though, saying that "One 
can grasp Nietzsche's conception of "Dionysian" joy while 
feeling that the more explicit 'doctrine' [of eternal 
recurrence] transforms a fruitful notion into a rigid 
crudity" (1974, 332). Stambaugh sees the eternal recurrence 
as providing the will to power with "something stable, 
something which constantly remains to be overcome and thus 
gives rise to more. Otherwise the Will to Power would simply 
be a chaotic flux" (1972, 14). In this sense, the eternal 
recurrence supports the will to power by guaranteeing the 
eternity of overcoming. The only difficulty with this 
interpretation is the Stambaugh sees the eternal recurrence 
as providing the will to power with a stable ground.
According to Stambaugh, the eternal recurrence complements
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the will to power by guaranteeing the eternal nature of the 
struggle, in the way the Greek contest calls for the 
perpetuation of competition. Connecting the eternal 
recurrence with the notion of will to power in this way can 
be awkward. Stambaugh wants to avoid the attempt to fit 
"Nietzsche's two fundamental concepts ... into the framework 
of a systematic relationship which Nietzsche never reached 
and perhaps did not wish to reach" (1972, 101). Though 
Nietzsche does not think of his philosophy as constituting an 
overarching system, it should nonetheless be possible to find 
a working connection between his two main doctrines. When 
the will to power and eternal recurrence are approached from
behind Nietzsche's text, that is, from the standpoint of
Heraclitus's cosmos and the Greek contest, the two can be
seen to fit together so that one does not exclude the other. 
If the eternal recurrence does stabilize the will to
power, it could only weaken the position of the overman. The 
overman is motivated by this most nihilistic thought, he is 
able to recognize his will to power because of the lack of 
any being or permanence, because of the lack of any stable 
ground beneath his feet. When the will to power and eternal 
recurrence are placed in the context of Heraclitean strife,
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the eternal recurrence no longer detracts from the will to 
power by serving as a stabilizer.
The eternal recurrence is Nietzsche's way of explaining 
the world of flux itself, and the effect it has on humanity.
In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, he writes:
The everlasting and exclusive coming-to-be, the 
impermanence of everything actual, which constantly 
acts and comes-to-be but never is, as Heraclitus 
teaches it, is a terrible, paralyzing thought. Its 
impact on men can most nearly be likened to the 
sensation during an earthquake when one loses one's 
familiar confidence in a firmly grounded earth. It 
takes astonishing strength to transform this 
reaction into its opposite, into sublimity and the 
feeling of blessed astonishment. Heraclitus 
achieved this by means of an observation regarding 
the actual process of all coming-to-be and passing 
away. He conceived it under the form of polarity, 
as being the diverging of a force into two
qualitatively different opposed activities that 
seek to re-unite. (PTG §5, 54)
According to this description of Heraclitus's cosmos, 
which is similar to Nietzsche's descriptions of the eternal 
recurrence, what redeems the eternal flux is the tension 
between extremes which is inherent in the process of becoming 
itself. Rather than a chaotic war between opposites, the 
struggle is an orderly contest in which each quality is 
inextricably bound to its opposite. The character of 
becoming is nihilistic in that the permanent victory of one 
opposite over another is impossible. There is no room for 
stability or being in this world of becoming.
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What is the connection between the world of becoming, of 
the eternal contest between opposites, and the will to power? 
The world of the eternal recurrence is the world of the great
individual who is able to contain and overcome his will to
power by transforming it from a nihilistic force into a 
productive one. If the eternal recurrence were to act upon 
the will to power in such a way as to lend order and 
permanence to it, then the burden of controlling this drive
is removed from the shoulders of the individual; for it is 
already contained. In this sense, the two concepts do not 
fit together. The will to power represents an unlimited, 
terrible drive, while the eternal recurrence represents an
ordered contest of forces that will never have a victor. In 
what way are the two compatible? The eternal recurrence is 
what the overman strives for within himself; for the rules of 
eternal becoming, of the contest, do not apply to humanity by 
nature. Each individual must choose whether to enter into
the eternal contest or to extinguish the struggle with his 
will to power by denying his passions altogether. The 
eternal recurrence and will to power fit together in that the 
strongest individuals must embrace the fact of eternal 
recurrence as a way of harnessing their will to power. It is 
the belief in eternal recurrence which gives them the
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strength to acknowledge the potential of this terrible drive
as a source of elevation and increase.
The quotation that Heidegger, Kaufman and Stambaugh cite 
can easily be misconstrued. It is important to note that 
Nietzsche only said that the eternal recurrence is the 
closest approximation of the world of becoming to a world of 
being. This does not mean that the eternal recurrence 
provides an element of being; the world is still referred to 
as the world of becoming. The eternal recurrence does not 
provide a semblance of being, for if it did, it would no 
longer serve as a nihilistic thought.
When the eternal recurrence and the will to power are no 
longer approached as being independent doctrines but as 
products of a particular view of life, it can be seen that 
they do not have to be alike in order to be compatible. When 
viewed in accordance with Nietzsche's affinity for Heraclitus 
and the Greek contest, they can both be seen to fit within 
Nietzsche's world-view, with each doctrine representing a 
different aspect of his viewpoint. Within the rejuvenated 
atmosphere of Heraclitean strife and the Greek contest, the
eternal recurrence takes on the role of the unwritten laws of 
becoming and the limiting nature of the contest. The will to 
power is that unrefined drive which strong individuals must
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acknowledge and overcome, by accepting the thought that the 
struggle will continue throughout eternity. These strong
individuals must live according to the eternal recurrence, so
that instead of abandoning the struggle to be human, their
natures are constantly transforming the will to power into 
something higher: always "flowing upward and downward in 
brazen rhythmic beat" (PTG §5, 51), "so that the contest of 
powers [will] once again awaken" (KS 1, 789).
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